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And vice-versa, an offense may be said to be necessarily included in another when all the ingredients of the former constitute a part of the elements constituting the latter (Rule 116, sec. Martinez, 55 Phil., 6.) In this connection, an offense may be said to necessarily include another when some of the essential ingredients of the former as alleged in the information constitute the latter. Under said Rules there is identity between two offenses not only when the second offense is exactly the same as the first, but also when the second offense is an attempt to commit the first or a frustration thereof, or when it necessary includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the first information. This so called "same-evidence test" which was found to be vague and deficient, was restated by the Rules of Court in a clearer and more accurate form. There is identity between the two offenses when the evidence to support a conviction for one offense would be sufficient to warrant a conviction for the other. It must be noticed that the protection of the Constitution inhibition is against a second jeopardy for the same offense, the only exception being, as stated in the same Constitution, that "if an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act." The phrase same offense, under the general rule, has always been construed to mean not only the second offense charged is exactly the same as the one alleged in the first information, but also that the two offenses are identical. It found expression in the Spanish Law and in the Constitution of the United States and is now embodied in our own Constitution as one of the fundamental rights of the citizen. It is embodied in the maxim of the civil law non bis in idem, in the common law of England, and undoubtedly in every system of jurisprudence, and instead of having specific origin it simply always existed. This principle is founded upon the law of reason, justice and conscience. It meant that when a person is charged with an offense and the case is terminated either by acquittal or conviction or in any other manner without the consent of the accused, the latter cannot again be charged with the same or identical offense. The rule of double jeopardy had a settled meaning in this jurisdiction at the time our Constitution was promulgated. "No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense," according to article III, section 1 (20) of our constitution. Under this provision, it was proper for the court to dismiss the first information and order the filing of a new one for the treason that the proper offense was not charged in the former and the latter did not place the accused in a second jeopardy for the same or identical offense. If it appears at may time before the judgment that a mistake has been made in charging the proper offense, the court may dismiss the original complaint or information and order the filing of a new one charging the proper offense, provided the defendant would not be placed thereby in double jeopardy, and may also require the witnesses to give bail for their appearance at the trial. Rule 106, section 13, 2d paragraph, is as follows: The accused filed a motion to quash the amended information alleging double jeopardy, motion that was denied by the respondent court hence, the instant petition for prohibition to enjoin the respondent court from further entertaining the amended information.īrushing aside technicalities of procedure and going into the substance of the issues raised, it may readily be stated that amended information was rightly allowed to stand. Evidence of death was available to the prosecution only on January 3, 1950, and on the following day, January 4, 1950, an amended information was filed charging the accused with consummated homicide. On December 29, 1949, at eight o'clock in the morning, the accused pleaded not guilty to the offense charged, and at 10:15 in the evening of the same day Benjamin Obillo died from his wounds. Petitioner Conrado Melo was charged in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, on December 27, 1949, with frustrated homicide, for having allegedly inflicted upon Benjamin Obillo, with a kitchen knife and with intent to kill, several serious wounds on different parts of the body, requiring medical attendance for a period of more than 30 days, and incapacitating him from performing his habitual labor for the same period of time. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF RIZAL, respondent-appellees.įirst Assistant Solicitor General Roberto A.